Modification and decommissioning
Change is inevitable, so control it
No safety instrumented system (SIS) stays the same for its whole life. Processes change, equipment becomes obsolete, set points are adjusted, new hazards are found, and SIL assessments are revisited. The aim of managing SIS modifications is simple: the validated system must not be compromised.
Every change request must identify the relevant parts of the safety lifecycle and repeat them, so that the impact of the change is fully understood before any work is authorised.
What counts as a modification
Under IEC 61511, a modification is any change to the SIS or its documentation that is not like-for-like replacement. For example:
- changing a trip set point, voting arrangement or response time;
- replacing a device with a different make or model;
- changing the logic solver application program, or its firmware;
- changing a proof test interval or procedure;
- raising or lowering the SIL of a SIF after a new SIL assessment;
- removing a SIF from proof testing;
- process changes that alter the hazards, demands or process safety time the SIF was designed for.
Even where the change looks small, the question to ask is the same: does it affect any assumption made in the hazard analysis, LOPA, SRS or SIL verification?
Plan the change
A modification must be planned and documented before work starts. Planning includes:
- The reason for the change, and what is proposed.
- An impact analysis. Which hazards, scenarios, SIFs, requirements and calculations are affected? Does the hazard and risk analysis need to be revisited? Does the SRS change? Is SIL verification still valid?
- A functional safety assessment of the impact analysis. The FSA must be carried out by a person who is competent and independent of those making the change.
- Repeating the affected lifecycle phases: updating the LOPA, SRS, design and SIL verification as needed.
- Revalidation of the modified SIS. This is mandatory: the parts affected must be tested again against the updated SRS.
- Updating all relevant documentation.
This is FSA stage 5, the assessment carried out after modification. See chapter 12: Functional safety audit.
Make the change safely
Changes to the SIS must only be made under authorised conditions, with normal safe working practices such as permits to work. The work must be done by people with the required competence. Every change should be logged when it is complete.
Finally, everyone affected by the change must be trained. This includes operators who see new alarms or bypasses, and maintenance staff with new proof test procedures.
Decommissioning
Decommissioning is just another modification, and it follows the same strict management of change procedure. This applies whether one SIF is removed or a whole SIS is taken out of service.
Before a SIF is removed, the impact analysis must confirm that the hazard it protected against has gone, or is managed in another way. It must also check that nothing else depends on the SIF, such as shared equipment, interlocks or another SIF’s assumptions. No SIF should be removed from proof testing, or have its SIL reduced, without following the modification procedure.
Documentation and traceability
IEC 61511 edition 2 made SIS documentation requirements normative: it is now a shall, not a should. Documentation must:
- describe the installation;
- be accurate and up to date;
- be easy to understand;
- be fit for purpose.
All SIS documentation must also show traceability back to the hazard and risk analysis. There must be a clear link from each SIF back to the hazard, the other protection layers, and the risk gap the SIF is designed to close.
A modification breaks that chain if the documents are not updated together. A set point changed in the logic solver but not in the SRS is a hidden error, waiting to be found at the next proof test or the next demand. A typical safety file, which functional safety assessors will look for, includes:
- the hazard and risk analysis, LOPA and SIL determination records;
- the SRS and SIL verification calculations;
- design documents, and equipment justifications such as certificates or prior use reports;
- validation records and the as-built status;
- proof test procedures and results, and demand, failure and bypass records;
- the modification history, with each impact analysis and FSA.
Closing the loop
The safety lifecycle is not a straight line from HAZOP to start-up. It is a loop. Each modification goes back to the phases it affects, and operating experience goes back to the hazard analysis. A SIS stays safe because every change passes through the same disciplined steps as the original design.
This chapter summarises the modification and decommissioning lessons in our IChemE-accredited course SIS and Functional Safety for IEC 61511 (eLP003). SIFintegrity manages SIS changes as projects, and releases them to the live record only when they are complete.